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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement District does not dispute 
nor object to the jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court to hear 
this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. Should Pickett v. California Pacific Utilities, 619 P.2d 325 
(Utah 1980), be overruled? 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a question of lawf 
which is reviewed for correctness. See Saunders v. Sharp, 
806 P.2d 198 (Utah 1991). 
II. Should the rule in Pickett v. California Pacific Utilities, 
619 P.2d 325 (Utah 1980), be applied to the installation of 
sewer lines and other utility facilities beneath public road 
rights-of-way? 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a question of law, 
which is reviewed for correctness. See Saunders v. Sharp, 806 
P.2d 198 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
I. Utah Code Annotated § 27-12-89: Public use constituting 
dedication. 
A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and 
abandoned to the use of the public when it has been 
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten 
years. 
II. Utah Code Annotated § 27-12-133: Excavations, structures or 
objects prohibited within right-of-way except in accordance 
with regulations - Penalty for violation. 
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Except as otherwise provided in Section 54-4-15, Utah 
code Annotated, 1953, no right-of-way of any state highway, 
county road or city street shall be dug up or excavated and no 
approach road, driveway, pole, pipeline, conduit, sewer, 
ditch, culvert, billboard, advertising sign, or any other 
structure or object of any kind or character shall be placed, 
constructed, or maintained within any such right-of-way except 
as permitted by, and in accordance with, the regulations of 
the highway authorities having jurisdiction over such right-
of-way. 
Any person who violates the provisions of this section is 
guilty of a misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Annotated § 27-12-134: Authorities may regulate, 
require permit and security for excavation or construction -
Limitation on authority. 
Except as otherwise provided in Section 54-4-15, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, the highway authorities of the state, 
counties, cities and towns are authorized to adopt 
regulations, and may require a permit containing reasonable 
terms and conditions, for the crossing, digging-up, or the 
placement, construction, and maintenance of approach roads, 
driveways, structures, poles, pipelines, conduits, sewers, 
ditches, culverts, facilities, or any other structures or 
objects of any kind or character on the public highway rights-
of-way under their respective jurisdiction. Said highway 
authorities may require a surety bond or other reasonable 
security which may be forfeited in the event the regulations 
or the conditions of a permit are breached. 
The authority granted by this section shall not be 
exercised so as to deny reasonable ingress and egress to 
property adjoining a public highway except where said highway 
authorities have acquired such right of ingress and egress by 
gift, agreement, purchase, eminent domain, or otherwise or 
where no right of ingress or egress exists between the right-
of-way and the adjoining property. 
Utah Code Annotated § 27-12-135: Installations constructed in 
violation of rules - Rights of highway authorities to remove 
or require removal. 
(1) If any person, firm, or corporation installs, 
places, constructs, alters, repairs, or maintains any approach 
road, driveway, pole, pipeline, conduit, sewer, ditch, 
culvert, outdoor advertising sign, or any other structure or 
object of any kind or character within the right-of-way of any 
highway without complying with this chapter, the highway 
authorities having jurisdiction over the right-of-way may: 
(a) remove the installation from the right-of-way 
or require the person, firm, or corporation to remove the 
installation; or 
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(b) give written notice to the person, firm, or 
corporation to remove the installation from the right-of-
way. 
(2) Notice under Subsection (1)(b) may be served by: 
(a) personal service; or 
(b) (i) mailing the notice to the person, firm, 
or corporation by certified mail; and 
(ii) posting a copy on the installation for 
ten days. 
(3) If the installation is not removed within ten days 
after the notice is complete, the highway authorities may 
remove the installation at the expense of the person, firm, or 
corporation. 
(4) The highway authorities may recover: 
(a) the costs and expenses incurred in removing the 
installation, serving notice, and the costs of a lawsuit 
if any; and 
(b) $10 for each day the installation remained 
within the right-of-way after notice was complete. 
(5) (a) If the person, firm, or corporation disputes or 
denies the existence, placement, construction, or 
maintenance of the installation, or refuses to remove or 
permit its removal, the highway authorities may bring an 
action to abate the installation as a public nuisance. 
(b) If the highway authorities are granted a 
judgment, the highway authorities may recover the costs 
of having the public nuisance abated as provided in 
Subsection (4). 
(6) The department, its agents, or employees, if acting 
in good faith, incur no liability for causing removal of an 
installation within a right-of-way of a highway as provided in 
this section. 
(7) The actions of the department under this section are 
not subject to the provisions of Chapter 46b, Title 63, the 
Administrative Procedures Act. 
V. Utah Code Annotated § 17-5-39franchises - Granting -
Terms and conditions. 
They may grant franchises along and over the public roads 
and highways for all lawful purposes, upon such terms, 
conditions and restrictions as in the judgment of the board 
may be necessary and proper, to be exercised in such manner as 
to present the least possible obstruction and inconvenience to 
the traveling public, but such permission shall not be for a 
longer period than fifty years. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement District accepts the 
Appellant's and Respondents' statements regarding the nature of the 
case. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement District accepts the 
Appellant's and Respondents' statements regarding the course of 
proceedings in this case. 
C. DEPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement District accepts the 
Appellant's and Respondents' statements regarding the disposition 
at trial. 
D. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement District accepts the 
Appellant's and Respondents' statements regarding the facts of the 
case. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Pickett v. California Pacific Utilities, 619 P.2d 325 
(Utah 1980) should not be overruled because both statutory and case 
law support the rationale that public highway rights-of-way, 
regardless of how obtained, are intended to be expansive in nature. 
4 
Sewer lines and other utility lines fall within the purview of such 
uses for public rights-of-way and do not constitute an increased 
burden on the abutting property for which compensation is required. 
2. Pickett is representative of the mainstream of 
contemporary law and its rationale should be explicitly made 
applicable to the installation of sewer lines within the public 
rights-of-way. The doctrine of stare decisis weighs heavily in 
favor of upholding Pickett and extending it to the present case 
because of the reliance that the public has placed on its rule of 
law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A decision by this Court to overrule Pickett or to refuse 
to extend its principles to the installation of sewer lines 
installed within a public right-of-way would have a very 
detrimental effect on the Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement 
District and the approximately 75 water and sewer districts in the 
State of Utah. Snyderville is a political subdivision created 
under the auspices of the laws of Utah. It provides sewage 
treatment and disposal for citizens and businesses within the 
Snyderville Basin and includes areas from Summit Park and Jeremy 
Ranch, to and including Park City, Utah. Like Snyderville, which 
has elected trustees, most of the sewer and water districts 
throughout the state are governmental entities with 
responsibilities to the citizens within their service area. With 
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the exception of possibly a few service districts within the Salt 
Lake City metropolitan area, the decision in this case will 
directly impact the current water and sewer service being offered 
throughout the geographical majority of the state and may have a 
significant effect on future expansion and growth in smaller 
communities and in rural Utah, 
From its inception in the late 1970's, Snyderville has relied 
on its ability to service outlying and newly developed subdivisions 
by accessing them with lines installed beneath the public rights-
of-way of roads connecting these subdivisions. Furthermore, much 
of the future growth potential within the District's boundaries 
depends upon the ability of the district to utilize the rights-of-
way in highways. (See Addendum 1, Affidavit of Rex Ausburn.) In 
addition to these problems, Park City, would likely be unable to 
financially cope with the expense involved in acquiring easements 
for the water and sewer lines within its city limits because many 
of the public streets and rights-of-way are not platted streets, 
but have been obtained by public use. (See Addendum 2, Affidavit 
of Eric W. DeHaan.) 
Snyderville, like the other water and sewer districts in the 
state, has relied upon the rule of law enunciated in Pickett and 
has made short and long range planning decisions based thereon. 
Snyderville and the other governmental entities require a ruling 
extending the Pickett decision to include underground sewer lines. 
While there is persuasive statutory and case law supporting 
the rule of law enunciated in Pickett, there is also an 
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overwhelming public policy argument in this state supporting 
Pickett. While many water and sewer districts throughout the state 
are small and have very modest financial resources, they each 
provide critically important services to the citizens of this 
state. If Pickett were overruled, not only would expansion of 
services become prohibitively expensive for many of the districts 
because they would be required to pay for use of easements already 
vested in the public, but many would have to allocate scarce 
resources to fend off lawsuits and pay for easements in which water 
and sewer pipes already lie. This is a case in which the greatest 
good for the greatest number in the long run favors upholding 
Pickett and extending its rationale to include underground sewer 
lines. 
II. STATUTORY LAW SUPPORTS THE PICKETT DECISION AND ITS EXTENSION 
TO UNDERGROUND SEWER LINES. 
An easement is an interest in property which, though distinct 
from an ownership in the land itself, nevertheless confers upon the 
holder of the easement an enforceable right to use the property of 
another. In this case, as in Pickett v. California Pacific 
Utilities, 619 P.2d 325 (Utah 1980), the highway easement in 
question was deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned to the use 
of the public because it was continuously used as a public 
thoroughfare for a period of ten years. Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89. 
Thus, there can be no doubt that the public, as represented by 
state and local governments, has an enforceable right to use the 
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property in question. The issue in this case is the nature and 
extent of the public's use. In deciding this issue, the Court 
should first look to the statutory scheme under which the easement 
was created. 
The easement at issue in this action was created by the 
express terms of Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89. However, the Court's 
review of the issue should not end with of review of this section. 
Rather, this section should be construed in harmony with other 
statutes relevant to the subject matter. Grayson Roper Ltd. 
Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 471-72 (Utah 1989); Stahl 
v. Utah Transit Authority. 618 P.2d 480, 481 (Utah 1980). 
Section 27-12-89 is located in Title 27 of the Utah Code 
entitled "Highways." This Title also includes several other 
provisions which indicate that the legislature intended that the 
installation of transmission poles, sewer lines and the like are 
within the scope of the public highway right-of-way created by 
Section 27-12-89. For example, Utah Code Ann § 27-12-133 states: 
. . . no right-of-way of any state highway, county road 
or city street shall be dug up or excavated and no 
approach road, driveway, pole, pipeline, conduit, sewer, 
ditch, culvert, billboard, advertising sign or any other 
structure or object of any kind or character shall be 
placed, constructed, or maintained within any such right-
of-way except as permitted by, and in accordance with, 
the regulations of the highway authorities having 
jurisdiction over such right-of-way. [Emphasis added] 
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-134 states: 
. . . the highway authorities of the state, counties, 
cities and towns are authorized to adopt regulations, and 
may require a permit containing reasonable terms and 
conditions, for crossing, digging up, or the placement, 
construction, and maintenance of approach roads, 
driveways, structures, poles, pipelines, conduits, 
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sewers, ditches, culverts, facilities, or any other 
structures or objects of any kind or character on the 
public highway rights-of-way under their respective 
jurisdiction . • . . [Emphasis added] 
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-135(1) provides: 
[i]f any person, firm, or corporation installs, 
places, constructs, alters, repairs, or maintains any 
approach road, driveway, pole, pipeline, conduit, sewer 
ditch, culvert, outdoor advertising sign, or any other 
structure or object of any kind or character within the 
right-of-wav of any highway without complying with this 
chapter, the highway authorities having jurisdiction over 
the right-of-way may . • . . (Emphasis added] 
In addition to the above statutes found in Title 27, Utah Code 
Ann. § 17-5-39 vests counties, such as Daggett County, with the 
power to 
grant franchises along and over public roads and highways 
for lawful purposes, upon such terms, conditions and 
restrictions as in the judgment of the board may be 
necessary and proper . . . . 
These statutes, as well as others within Title 27, make it 
clear that sewer lines and other utility lines are structures that 
are expected to be built and are intended to be part of and 
included within the right-of-way for a public highway. If this 
were not so, the legislature would not have provided counties with 
the power to grant franchises over highways and to regulate the 
conditions under which sewers and the like may be installed, 
repaired or removed. The legislature intended that sewers and 
other public utility structures be within the scope of a public 
highway right-of-way regardless of whether the right-of-way was 
acquired by use or formal dedication. Any other interpretation is 
at odds with legislative intent in this regard. 
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This Court previously adopted a similar position when it 
declared that 
. . . public welfare demands that the people be served 
with water, sewer systems, electricity, gas, telephone 
and telegraph, as well as transportation and means of 
travel. These services are vital to the well-being of 
our various communities. It would be almost impossible 
to meet these urgent requirements without making use of 
the public property. The presence of the utility 
facilities on the streets constitutes a use in the public 
interest subject to public regulation, and an object 
within the purview of a public policy to be established 
by the legislature. 
Pickett, 619 P. 2d at 327 (quoting State Road Commission v. Utah 
Power & Light Co., 353 P.2d 171 (Utah I960)). As demonstrated in 
this Brief, the Town of Manila's Brief as well as in other Amicus 
Briefs, the legislative intent is as clear today as it was when 
Pickett was decided. Appellants have failed to provide the Court 
with a persuasive basis for overruling Pickett. Thus, the Court 
should uphold Pickett and affirm the trial court's decision and 
extend the Pickett rationale to include sewer and other utility 
structures within the scope of the public highway right-of-way 
created by Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89. 
III. CASE LAW SUPPORTS THE PICKETT DECISION AND IT EXTENSION TO 
UNDERGROUND SEWER LINES. 
While in the past there has been a diversity of opinion among 
the various jurisdictions as to whether utility lines constitute a 
public use within the scope of a public easement, this amicus has 
found no diversity of opinion in recent years in cases adjudicating 
underground sewer lines. Furthermore, the Broadbent Brief failed 
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to cite a single case supporting its position that deals with sewer 
lines. Since the instant case concerns the question of whether the 
installation of underground sewer lines in a right-of-way obtained 
by public use constitutes an increased burden on the abutting 
property, several of the numerous cases which support Manilafs and 
the Amici Curiae position will be reviewed below. The holdings in 
each of these cases support the rationale in Pickett and support 
the extension of Pickett to include underground sewer lines. 
In Bentel v. Bannock, 104 Idaho 130, 656 P.2d 1383 (1983), a 
case dealing with a County Board of Commissioner's grant of a 
city's application to place sewer lines under a county road right-
of-way obtained by prescriptive use, the court determined that an 
easement in a county road includes "the right to install sub-
surface pipelines for waste water transmission." 656 P.2d at 1387. 
The court also found that the installation of sewage pipelines in 
a roadway easement did not increase the burden on a servient 
estate, because the scope of a public road easement was 
comprehensive enough to include "reasonably foreseeable public uses 
of such roadways, such as sub-surface installations for sewage, 
run-off, communications and other services necessary to the 
increased quality of life which generally accompanies the growth of 
civilization." 656 P.2d at 1386. 
In Evde Brothers Development Co. , v. Eaton County Drain 
Commissioner, 398 N.W.2d 297 (Mich. 1986), an owner of property 
abutting a highway dedicated by public use contended that the 
highway easement extended only to surface transportation and that 
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efforts to construct a sewer beneath the highway was an illegal 
trespass and taking. That court held that "the scope of an 
easement within a highway established by user includes the right to 
build sewers without the consent of or compensation to the fee 
owner..-11 398 N.W.2d at 302. 
In Bolinaer v. City of Bozeman, 493 P. 2d 1062 (Mont. 1972), a 
case with facts strikingly similar to the instant case, the Montana 
court held that the public easement in a county highway is not 
solely restricted to use of the roadway for movement of vehicular 
traffic, but under such easement, a municipal sewer may be 
installed without the consent of or compensation to adjoining 
landowners. In support of this holding, the court quoted the 
following language from a Minnesota1 case: 
If there is any one fact established in the history of 
society and of the law itself, it is that the mode of 
exercising this easement is expansive, developing and 
growing as civilization advances. 
* * * Hence it has become settled law that the easement 
is not limited to the particular methods of use in vogue 
when the easement was acquired, but includes all new and 
improved methods, the utility and general convenience of 
which may afterwards be discovered and developed in aid 
of the general purpose for which highways are designed. 
* * * Another proposition, which we believe to be sound, 
is that the public easement in a highway is not limited 
to travel or transportation of persons or property in 
moveable vehicles. * * * But it is now universally 
conceded that urban highways may be used for constructing 
sewers and laying pipes for the transmission of gas, 
water, and the like for public use. * * * The uses 
referred to of urban streets are not in aid of travel, 
but are themselves independent and primary uses, although 
1
 Cater v. Northwestern Tel. Exch. Co., 60 Minn. 539, 63 N.W. 
Ill (construction of a telephone line along a rural highway found 
to be within the public easement on plaintiff's property). 
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all within the general purpose for which highways are 
designed. Neither can a distinction between urban and 
rural ways be sustained on the ground that such uses were 
contemplated when the public easement was acquired in the 
former but not when the easement was acquired in the 
latter. 
* * * In our judgment, public highways, whether urban or 
rural, are designed as avenues of communication; and, if 
the original conception of a highway was limited to 
travel and transportation of property in moveable 
vehicles, it was because these were the only modes of 
communication then known; that as a civilization 
advanced, and new and improved methods of communication 
and transportation were developed, these are all in aid 
of and within the general purpose for which highways are 
designed. Whether it be travel, the transportation of 
persons and property, or the transmission of 
intelligence, and whether accomplished by old methods or 
by new ones, they are all included within the public 
'highway easement,' and impose no additional servitude on 
the land... 
493 P.2d at 1065-1066 (quoting Cater v. Northwestern Tel. Exch. 
Co.. 60 Minn. 539, 63 N.W. Ill, 112). 
These are but a few of the cases dealing with the precise 
issue before this Court in the case at bar. Each of them adhere to 
the reasoning set forth in Pickett that "uses of a public highway 
are expansive and are not confined to uses either permitted .or 
contemplated at the time of dedication but are extended to new 
uses, consistent and proper as civilization advances." Pickett, 
619 P. 2d at 327. Based upon such reasoning, Pickett should not be 
overruled but should be upheld and explicitly extended to include 
underground sewer lines. 
IV. PICKETT SHOULD BE UPHELD BASED UPON THE DOCTRINE OP STARE 
DECISIS. 
Not only should Pickett be upheld and extended to include the 
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installation of underground sewer lines and other utilities based 
upon both statutory and case law, but the doctrine of stare decisis 
also ways heavily in favor of upholding Pickett, As stated in 
Justice Hall's dissenting opinion in Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 
417 (Utah 1990): 
Today's decision needs be controlled [b]y the important 
doctrine of stare decisis, the means by which we ensure 
that the law will not merely change erratically, but will 
develop in a principled and intelligible fashion. That 
doctrine permits society to presume that bed-rock 
principles are founded in the law rather than in the 
proclivities of individuals, and thereby contributes to 
the integrity of our constitutional system of government, 
both in appearance and in fact. While stare decisis is 
not an inexorable command, the careful observer will 
discern that any detours from the straight path of stare 
decisis in our past have occurred for articulable 
reasons, and only when the Court has felt obliged "to 
bring its opinions into agreement with experience and 
with facts newly ascertained." 
Our history does not impose any rigid formula to 
constrain the Court in the disposition of cases. Rather, 
its lesson is that every successful proponent of 
overruling precedent has borne the heavy burden of 
persuading the Court that changes in society or in the 
law dictate that the values served by stare decisis yield 
in favor of a greater objective. In [this case] we have 
been offered no reason to believe that any such 
metamorphosis has rendered the Court's long commitment to 
a rule of reversal outdated, ill-founded, unworkable, or 
otherwise legitimately vulnerable to serious 
reconsideration. On the contrary, the need for such a 
rule is as compelling today as it was at its inception. 
Staker, 785 P.2d at 424-25, (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 
254, 265-66, 106 S.Ct. 617, 624, 88 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986)). 
The brief of Broadbent Land Company has not "borne the heavy 
burden of persuading the Court that changes in society or in the 
law dictate that the values served by stare decisis must yield in 
favor of a greater objective." Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 266. To the 
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contrary, Broadbent's brief relies on case law that represents a 
minority position among the various jurisdictions and which has not 
been relied upon by other courts in recent years. Furthermore, 
Broadbent has failed to cite supporting cases which deal with the 
specific factual and legal questions before the Court and has 
failed to articulate any persuasive public policy rationale for 
overruling Pickett. 
A statement by United States Supreme Court Justice Stevens in 
a concurring opinion is instructive in this regard: 
Of even greater importance, however, is my concern about 
the potential damage to the legal system that may be 
caused by frequent or sudden reversals of direction that 
may appear to have been occasioned by nothing more 
significant than a change in the identity of this Court's 
personnel. Granting that a zigzag is sometimes the best 
course, I am firmly convinced that we have a profound 
obligation to give recently decided cases the strongest 
presumption of validity. That presumption is supported 
by much more than the desire to foster an appearance of 
certainty and impartiality in the administration of 
justice, or the interest in facilitating the labor of 
judges. The presumption is an essential thread in the 
mantel of protection that the law affords the individual. 
Citizens must have confidence that the rules on which 
they rely in ordering their affairs — particularly when 
they are prepared to take issue with those in power in 
doing so — are rules of law and not merely the opinions 
of a small group of men who temporarily occupy high 
office. 
For me, the adverse consequences of adhering to an 
arguably erroneous precedent in the case are far less 
serious than the consequences of further unraveling the 
doctrine of stare decisis. 
Staker, 785 P.2d at 425, (quoting Florida Dept. of Health and 
Rehab. Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n. 450 U.S. 147, 152-55 
(1981)(Stevens, J., concurring)). 
From its inception, Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement 
District, as well as the other amici, have relied upon common law 
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doctrines relating to the use of public easements for sewer line 
purposes. Such reliance was bolstered in 1980 when this Court 
ruled in Pickett that utility poles are permissive uses within a 
public highway easement. 
In the words of Justice Hall's dissent in Staker, Broadbent 
has "not offered any new facts, claims, or special justifications, 
in view of other decisions by the Court in this context, meriting 
'serious reconsideration' or rendering the 'Court's long commitment 
to a rule of reversal outdated, ill-founded, unworkable, or 
otherwise legitimately vulnerable to serious reconsideration.'" 
Staker, 785 P.2d at 426, (quoting Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 266). 
In view of these facts and the policy behind the doctrine of 
stare decisis, the Court should uphold its decision in Pickett and 
allow it to remain "until changed by the legislature, whose 
prerogative it is to make and to change the law." State v. 
Kelback, 569 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Utah 1977). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in the foregoing Argument, Pickett 
should not be overruled because its reasoning is consistent with 
statutory and case law and provides the greatest benefit for the 
greatest number of people in this state without infringing upon the 
rights of individuals or their property. In addition, the 
rationale in Pickett should be extended to permit sewer pipes to be 
installed within the public road rights-of-way without the consent 
of or compensation to the abutting property owner. Snyderville 
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respectfully requests this Court to uphold the Pickett decision and 
affirm the lower Court's ruling applying Pickett to the facts of 
this case. 
DATED this /Y "^5ay of November, 1991. 
HALEY & STOLEBARGER 
LL 
Jepfrffy W. /Appel 
Blaine J. Benard 
Attorneys for Snyderville 
Basin Sewer Improvement Dist, 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF REX AUSBURN 
COMES NOW Rex Ausburn, and being first duly sworn, deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. I am the General Manager of the Snyderville Basin Sewer 
Improvement District (SBSID). 
2. At my request the staff of SBSID reviewed the locations 
for existing and proposed sanitary sewer service within the 
District. 
3. After the creation of the SBSID in the late 1970's and 
its expansion during the early 1980's, several miles of outfall 
and trunk sewers were constructed at public expense within 
rights-of-way of roads dedicated by public use. 
4. The acquisition of easements in non-dedicated rights-
of-way at public expense for the development and expansion of 
services in the District would have precluded some of the 
construction being feasible. The result would have been a 
decrease or delay in the number of residents receiving the very 
service for which the District was created. 
5. Like many of the existing sewer mains, the majority of 
future lines will likely be installed in road rights-of-way 
dedicated to the public by use. 
6. Because of the rural area served by the SBSID, most 
roads outside of new subdivisions are not officially dedicated to 
Summit County but are roads that have existed for many years. We 
anticipate extending sewer service throughout the Basin over the 
next few years and will utilize the miles of existing roads which 
have been dedicated to the public by use. 
7. The costs to the public associated with future sanitary 
sewer construction within the SBSID will be greatly impacted by a 
requirement to purchase rights-of-way for construction within 
existing public roads. All additional costs required for right-
of-way acquisition will be a direct increase in the cost to the 
citizens of our District. 
DATED this lA* ^  day of November, 1991. 
REX AUSBURN 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this lH day of November, 
1991 
litf-iSaoUi, nw^ rfWih 
DARLENEZ WHITE 
Notary Pub'.c 
STME OF tJAxH iRY PUBLIC V 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY O F o U m - m / i ~ ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF ERIC W. DEHAAN 
COMES NOW ERIC W. DEHAAN, and, being first duly sworn, deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. That he is currently employed as City Engineer for Park 
City Municipal Corporation and has been so employed in excess of five 
years. 
2. That he is the custodian of all official maps and plats of 
Park City and is familiar with the official surveys of Park City and the 
locations of the City's streets and highways. 
3. That, among his duties as City Engineer, are the 
coordination of, installation and repair of municipal and other utility 
lines, pipes and wires within the City's streets and other public 
rights-of-way. 
4. That in the areas of Park City originally subdivided by 
recordation of the Park City and Snyder's Addition surveys, many of the 
historic and actually travelled public streets and rights-of-way are not 
located within platted, dedicated streets and rights-of-way. 
5. The City's longstanding policy has been and is still to 
treat historically travelled streets and rights-of-way as dedicated to 
the public and under the jurisdiction of Park City pursuant to long 
periods of public use. 
6. It has further been the longstanding practice of Park City 
to operate and maintain such streets and rights-of-way and to utilize 
them for the location of municipal and franchisee utility pipes, lines 
and cables for the service and benefit of the general public and of the 
abutting property owners in particular. 
7. In my opinion, as a professional engineer, the cost of 
relocating all the public utilities in Park City which lie beneath roads 
located outside the platted public easements and the cost of obtaining, 
at market prices, rights-of-way for such utilities would impose an 
unreasonable economic burden on the City tavpayprg^ag^ utility 
